Problems in the Reform of Educational Finance: A Case Study by Sale, Tim & Levin, Benjamin
 32 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 16:1 (1991) 
                    
 
Problems in the Reform of 
Educational Finance: A Case Study* 
 
Tim Sale 
t. sale and associates 
 
Benjamin Levin 
university of manitoba 
 
 
Educational finance reform proposals emphasize too heavily features of desirable 
financing systems, and underplay the significant constraints facing any reform 
proposal. Persons interested in finance reform should pay more attention to factors 
affecting both adoption and implementation, including limits on decision makers' 
time, attention, and understanding; the difficulty of integrating all relevant 
considerations; political limitations; and problems of implementation. We illustrate 
these constraints and their implications for finance reform through a case study of 
a Canadian province. 
 
Les projets de réforme des finances en matière d'éducation insistent trop sur les 
caractéristiques des systèmes de financement souhaités et minimisent les con-
traintes importantes auxquelles est soumis tout projet de réforme. Les personnes 
qui s'intéressent à cette question devraient davantage prendre en compte les 
facteurs ayant une incidence sur l'adoption et l'implantation d'une réforme, y 
compris les contraintes de temps et les connaissances limitées des décideurs, la 
difficulté d'intégrer toutes les considérations pertinentes, les contraintes politiques 
et les problèmes liés à la mise en oeuvre d'une réforme. Nous illustrons ces 
contraintes et leurs répercussions sur les réformes des finances à l'aide d'une étude 
de cas tirée d'une province canadienne. 
 
 
The case we wish to make is a simple one. We contend that discussion of 
educational finance reform has emphasized too much the elements of a 
desirable financing system, and not enough the significant constraints facing 
any reform proposal. We contend that finance reform can only be understood, 
 
*The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of J.A. Riffel, Peter Coleman, 
Kent McGuire and Elchanan Cohen on earlier versions of this paper. 
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and indeed should only be undertaken, with greater attention to factors 
affecting both adoption and implementation. We set out, using a particular 
case in which both authors were participants, to illustrate some of the 
limitations on the reform of educational finance, and conclude with 
suggestions for educational finance reformers. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The reform of educational finance is never-ending. Jurisdictions frequently 
change their approach to educational finance in order to maximize such goals 
as equity, excellence, efficiency, local control, or accountability. Finance 
reform is also motivated, of course, by such considerations as tight budgets, 
legal issues, and new programs. 
 The finance literature is extensive and wide-ranging. We believe, however, 
that it has underutilized relevant research on policy adoption and 
implementation, even though many have recognized the importance of these 
elements (Garms, 1986). For example, texts on educational finance often give 
much more attention to various finance formula approaches than to the politics 
of finance (Burrupp, 1977; Guthrie, Garms & Pierce, 1988; Johns, Morphet & 
Alexander, 1983). Reviews of finance literature (for example, Guthrie, 1988) 
also give insufficient play to political considerations. Finance policy is 
regarded primarily as a matter of working out formulas (Barro, 1989); the key 
role of political and organizational considerations in policy making is 
understated. 
 
CONSTRAINTS ON THE ADOPTION OF REFORM 
 
The decision to adopt a new mode of financing education is essentially 
political, even when the impetus is judicial (Colvin, 1989; Ward, 1988). A 
political body will decide what reforms, if any, to make. That being said, many 
discussions of reform do not take into account the limitations politics 
necessarily impose. 
 Our approach borrows heavily from Dror (1986), whose analysis of 
problems of policy making is, in our view, unsurpassed. We identify four main 
limitations on policy making, recognizing that they are separable only 
intellectually, and that other formulations could well be developed. 
1.The limits of decision makers' time, attention, and understanding. 
2. The difficulty in integrating all relevant aspects of reform. 
3. The limits imposed by political elements on the scope of any reform. 
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4. The difficulty of dealing with issues of implementation. 
 
Time, Attention, and Understanding 
 
Educational finance is complex and even the simplest finance formula or 
system (and most are far from simple) has multiple components. On the 
revenue side, there are questions of the balance among revenue elements, at 
both the district and provincial levels. These require consideration of property 
values, property assessment policies, other tax sources, and so on. On the 
expenditure side, the various competing goals of a finance system must be 
kept in mind. So must the mix of elements (categorical, block, equalization, 
and other grants), as well as the specific policies to be adopted for each of 
these elements. 
 All of this is complex enough to fill a long textbook. It is also relatively 
unfamiliar territory to many elected officials asked to determine, or at least to 
approve, changes to current practice. Educational finance reform therefore 
impels decision makers to acquire a very considerable amount of knowledge in 
a complex, technical, and sometimes arcane field. 
 The decision maker at the provincial level must also consider the political 
dimension of proposed reforms. How will any particular proposal affect 
various political constituencies? Whose districts will benefit, and whose will 
lose? How will interest groups react to the various provisions? Although there 
are agreements on some technical aspects of educational finance, the weighing 
of political considerations will necessarily be subjective (Lawton, 1979). 
 Then there is the matter of the place of educational finance reform on a 
government's overall agenda. Complex and important as it is, finance reform 
competes with many other issues facing any administration, many equally 
complex and many ranking higher on the political agenda. Thus, the time a 
provincial Cabinet may devote to understanding finance reform is likely to be 
limited. This is not a hopeful conclusion, given earlier comments on the 
complexity of finance as a subject, and most decision makers' relative 
unfamiliarity with it. 
 
Integration of Relevant Aspects 
 
Educational finance is itself complex, but also linked to other, equally 
complex matters that would, in the best of possible worlds, receive simulta-
neous consideration. Educational finance should be considered in the general 
context of municipal taxation systems, property assessment systems, and 
taxation levels. Important constitutional or legal provisions may affect finance 
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decisions. Other levels of government are involved, and their views and 
situations must be taken into account. Equally, decisions about educational 
finance must attend to likely spending consequences, and thus to the place and 
priority of education as compared with other areas of expenditure. In Canada, 
for example, health care is consistently the public's number-one spending 
priority (Morrow, 1985), although there is evidence that education is moving 
up the public agenda (Livingstone & Hart, 1987). Since health care costs 
continue to rise more rapidly than inflation, relative priorities determine how 
much money may be available for educational finance regardless of the merits 
of any particular financing scheme. Indeed, lack of money has itself been a 
powerful motive for changes in financing systems in Canadian provinces 
(Fleming & Anderson, 1984). 
 A second set of conditions that should be, but frequently are not integrated 
into policy calculations are those to do with possible impacts and outcomes. 
Although it is reasonable to ask what impact any educational finance plan 
might have on the actual provision of schooling, or to ask what unanticipated 
outcomes might result, such questions are not often posed in the 
policy-making process. Thus, until recently, justifications of educational 
finance proposals rarely mentioned their impact at the school or classroom 
level, or even the programmatic effects at the district level. 
 This is so despite the fact that no policy will produce all the desired effects 
and will produce unanticipated, although not always negative, results (Jordan 
& McKeown, 1988). Levin (1988) has pointed out the unused potential of 
cost-effectiveness in deciding educational policy, noting the system's 
incapacity to take into account this fact. Coleman and LaRocque (1990), 
Hanushek (1986; 1989), and Walberg (1984), among others, have argued that 
current financing practices are unlikely to have the desired effect on school 
outcomes. One possibility is that in making decisions we lack the will or the 
skills to think through questions of impact. Alternatively, there may be 
compelling reasons to discount such questions when decisions are being made. 
 In fact, both are likely. Dror (1986) notes a number of `` policymaking 
incapacities'' (p. 131) involving features of organizations and features of 
human thinking. He claims that 
 
Currently known core policymaking institutions, including structures and pro-
cesses and their interactions, have limited maximum performance capacities, error 
propensities, and resulting incapacities. These result partly from inbuilt character-
istics of the process-system and of the materials out of which it is made. (p. 133) 
 
Dror concludes, to simplify an eloquent and detailed argument, that although 
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policy-making incapacities can be reduced, there are important reasons for 
believing they cannot be eliminated or even made negligible; `` Many 
incapacities are shared by all central minds of governments, being in the main 
common to all contemporary forms of governments'' (p. 216). 
 
Political Constraints 
 
Political calculations will inevitably—and properly—play on government 
decision making about educational finance. Beyond the requirement politically 
to calculate, however, politics impose absolute restraints on reform. For 
example, a system in which the majority of members of a legislature represent 
rural districts militates against reforms that would increase the rural tax 
burden. 
 Some contend that these political elements interfere with rational decision 
making. In our opinion, that view misconstrues democracy, where we trust 
these political elements to yield a better decision than would any competing 
method. We do not pretend for a moment that political processes always result 
in good decisions. 
 
Implementation 
 
There is now a very considerable body of literature on policy implementation, 
both in education (McLaughlin, 1987) and more generally in public policy and 
administrative studies (Linder & Peters, 1987; Wildavsky, 1979). If one were 
to find a lesson in this work, it would surely be that implementation cannot be 
taken for granted; what is intended and what results are often different. 
 Several implementation issues require especially careful attention in 
considering educational finance change: the capacity of the system (including 
the people in it) to understand and to absorb the change, the willingness of the 
system to do so, and the various unanticipated but nonetheless serious effects 
of any change. Majone (1975) has argued that policy making should discard 
optimal solutions in favour of a stringent focus on feasible choices, thus 
requiring careful attention to implementation: `` When all . . . constraints are 
taken into consideration, the range of feasible choices turns out to be much 
more restricted than is usually assumed'' (p. 50). Of course, some would 
suggest that consideration of feasibility, however flawed, is precisely what 
political processes accomplish. 
 Finally, we should note Dror's concept of `` high probability of low 
probability events.'' In other words, we can predict that in the course of policy 
making and execution some very significant surprises will occur, with major 
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resulting disruption. We cannot—and this is true by definition— predict which 
particular surprises these will be. 
 Given all of this, it is not surprising that educational finance changes are 
rarely well thought out, have multiple and possibly contradictory goals, or are 
undertaken without adequate attention to practical results. Our perspective 
suggests no alternative. 
 In the remainder of this article, we illustrate these considerations through 
description of a case study of educational finance change in Manitoba. 
 
THE CASE 
 
The Setting 
 
The Province of Manitoba has some sixty school divisions and districts. There 
are a total of about 200,000 students in 700 schools, about 250 of which enrol 
fewer than 200 students. School districts were consolidated more than twenty 
years ago, resulting in large rural districts. However, declining population and 
demographic changes have meant that even geographically large districts may 
have very small and dispersed student populations. This makes pupil 
transportation a major concern. More than half of all divisions/districts had 
fewer than 1500 students in 1989. 
 Additionally, school districts vary greatly in size, the smallest having under 
1,000 students, the largest more than 30,000. There are great geographic, 
demographic, economic, tax base, and other disparities among districts. About 
80% of the funding of public schools in Manitoba is supplied by the provincial 
government through convoluted arrangements. This is exclusive of a large 
program of property tax credits normally not seen as education funding even 
though they reduce school tax. 
 
The Authors' Perspective 
 
The case is built from the authors' personal experience. Both of us were on the 
staff of the Manitoba Department of Education during many of the events we 
describe, one as Assistant Deputy Minister for educational finance, the other in 
senior staff positions not directly involved in reforms. Both of us left the 
Department—one in 1988 and the other in 1989. The case description derives 
from documentary sources and from our experiences and recollections. We 
sought and received critical review by others directly involved in these events. 
 
Background to Change 
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Manitoba implemented its program of school finance in 1984, after extensive 
public review of an earlier system implemented only in 1980. To understand 
why there were three major shifts in less than a decade, the reader should 
know that Manitoba changed its governing party in 1977, 1981, and again in 
1988; each new government brought forward new programs of educational 
finance. 
 The review discussed in this article sprang from two major sources, reform 
of the province's property assessment system, and the recommendation in the 
1984 reform that, after three years' operation, the Government Support to 
Education Program (GSEP) be reviewed. In addition to these formal causes, 
there had been widespread dissatisfaction with major features of the GSEP, 
particularly the role of equalization payments and the degree to which the 
GSEP was based upon the previous year's expenditures of each school 
division. 
 The review began internally in March 1986, and initially was coordinated 
with assessment reform through a staff committee representing five provincial 
departments and the central government's policy arm. Public review 
commenced in the fall of 1986 with a series of regional meetings with 
members of the Manitoba Association of School Trustees (MAST), the 
Manitoba Teachers' Society (MTS), and the Manitoba Association of School 
Business Officials (MASBO). These meetings were designed to sensitize 
audiences to major policy issues in Manitoba's educational finance. Various 
groups submitted briefs. The Department discussed `` work in progress'' with 
the groups, with the support of the Minister and Deputy Minister. The 1989 
spring Throne Speech indicated that the government would issue a `` consul-
tation paper'' on this subject during the 1989 session of the legislative 
assembly. Despite later announcements that release was imminent, as of this 
writing (January 1991) the consultation paper has not appeared. The three 
organizations know that the consultation paper has been in draft for a year, and 
have indicated to the Minister their hope it will be circulated for their 
comment and reaction prior to formal release. The Minister has indicated his 
wish for further seminars, but has not yet directed that these take place. 
 
Major Stakeholders in the Review 
 
There are four major stakeholders: 
 
 Central government: Anxious to control expenditure growth and to reduce 
unpredictability of fiscal demands. Prefers a structural rather than an ad hoc 
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approach. 
 Department of Education: Interested in a wide range of program issues 
including transportation, special needs, giftedness, libraries, and guidance. 
Recognizes limitations on funding but sees uneven program delivery across 
the province. 
 Providers: Teachers, Trustees, Superintendents, and other administrators, 
all of whom emphasize program availability and cost control, yet value local 
autonomy. This group has the greatest variety of agendas. 
 Recipients: Children and parents, whose lobby groups want specific 
solutions to local issues. For example, parents want more program variety. 
Lobby groups want `` more'' of whatever they exist to lobby for. This is the 
least articulate and most diffuse group. 
 
 The last stakeholder group—recipients—has not been formally included in 
the review, with the exception of such specific lobby groups as a library 
committee of parents in one school and advocacy groups presenting briefs. 
The review was set up to provide significant political opportunity to educa-
tional interest groups regarded as having the most political influence. One 
outcome was a bias towards the status quo, since changes unacceptable to any 
group were likely to be rejected before any formal report. The Manitoba 
Teachers' Society has well-developed policies on educational finance the 
review must consider if the Society is to be satisfied with proposed change. 
Extensive consultation thus narrows the range of possible policy choices. It 
also shifts governments' attention towards the political agendas of the 
participants, perhaps at the cost of more consideration of educationally sound 
alternatives. Consultation also emphasized the formula more than its 
implementation and follow-up, which organizations see as their prerogatives. 
 
Major Issues in the Review 
 
To the government, the major policy issues have to do with the desirability 
and feasibility of change from fiscal, administrative, and political perspectives. 
These issues might be explored under the following headings: 
 How imperative is the overall need for change? (central government, 
school boards, taxpayers) 
 How imperative is the need for change from a program perspective? 
(department and field) 
 How feasible is any change that would take into account the fiscal realities 
of central government? 
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 How feasible is any program change of interest to the department and its 
clients? 
 
No single proposal could satisfy all these divergent agendas. Thus reform must 
take into account, as it proceeds, both the substantive desires of the 
participants, and their relative political clout. Careful management is required. 
 
The Imperative of Change 
 
Manitoba's overall fiscal situation is that of a `` poor'' province. This status is 
not likely to change in the foreseeable future. Wage pressures in the education 
sector are nonetheless increasing as teachers come off a two-year agreement 
that did not provide increases to meet rises in the cost-of-living. Pressures will 
be greater because of teacher shortages in Ontario and British Columbia. 
 In terms of program expenditures, and because of Manitoba's rapidly aging 
population, the greatest fiscal pressure facing the Province arises particularly 
but not exclusively from the health care sector. Debt service costs will also 
continue to require a significantly larger proportion of current income than 
was the case a decade ago. 
 Despite the major structural fiscal isses noted above, the present funding of 
Manitoba's public education system does not reflect the province's underlying 
financial situation. Manitoba's pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) of 14.9:1 is the lowest 
in Canada. The average of all provincial PTRs in Canada today is 16.7:1 
(Council of Ministers of Education of Canada, 1988). The difference between 
Manitoba's and the average Canadian PTR represents over $60 million 
annually in salary costs. Manitoba also spends more than the Canadian 
average per pupil, and devotes a higher percentage of gross provincial product 
(GPP) to education than do other, wealthier, provinces. The student population 
is stable, with no projected significant increase. 
 Educational finance research shows that much variation in per-pupil 
expenditures can be explained by pupil-teacher ratios. The PTR is thus both a 
major structural issue and a major policy lever in control of education costs. It 
is unclear whether smaller PTRs increase pupil performance. Some researchers 
contend that lowering of PTR is a poor use of educational resources (for a 
recent treatment of this issue, see Tomlinson, 1989). 
 As many jurisdictions do, Manitoba faces economic pressure to restrain 
expenditure growth in the education sector so funds can be allocated to higher 
demand areas. To accomplish this politically difficult task, allocation 
mechanisms must be, and be seen to be fair and balanced. Moreover, any 
changes must be realizable in practice. School divisions and teachers will 
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accept only with difficulty any proposal that would effectively raise pupil- 
teacher ratios. Just as importantly, if schools and school divisions do not wish 
to, or do not see how to provide education with a somewhat higher PTR, then 
a proposal to increase PTR is likely to be unworkable, or to create more 
negative consequences than it otherwise might. 
 
School Board Perspective 
 
Although school divisions, like other publicly funded bodies, will always wish 
for more funding than is available, divisions face serious problems as a result 
of GSEP structures. 
 The GSEP requires divisions to provide the first-year costs of any new 
program, with the GSEP providing support from the second year. This means 
divisions able to raise local support can attract provincial support after one 
year, whereas those with less local fiscal capacity are less able to do so. 
Divisions with low assessment bases may face extreme local tax pressures 
when raising very small sums of money. This is especially problematic given 
the substantial differences in local tax bases among Manitoba school divisions. 
 As well, the GSEP makes no allowance for the extreme range in Manitoba 
in costs of transportation, special needs services, or other unevenly distributed 
costs of education. Coleman (1987) has suggested that uncontrollable costs are 
due largely to geographic factors, and account for a high proportion of cost 
variation among school districts. 
 Equalization grants are tied to balanced per-pupil assessment. Although 
this is a logical measure of a division's ability to raise funds on its local tax 
base, it works against those divisions with declining enrolment. As enrolment 
drops, their balanced assessment per-pupil rises, making them appear 
wealthier and less in need of equalization. In fact, their costs do not decline in 
step with enrolment, and their per-pupil costs often increase. 
 Finally, the GSEP contains no provision for such services as libraries and 
guidance teachers, considered necessary in a modern education system. 
Although support for these services could be introduced through categorical 
grants, this would add excessively to the costs of the system, since many 
wealthier divisions are now providing these services through their local levy. 
Others, with weak levy bases, cannot afford to do so. 
 The above analysis illustrates how imperative is educational finance reform 
from the board perspective. Reforms, however, will likely be acceptable only 
insofar as they add funds for `` needful'' programs without reducing funding in 
others. If some boards are penalized and others gain, the political costs of 
reform will rise steeply. Boards will see any proposed reform from their own, 
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rather narrow point of view rather than the broader provincial perspective. 
And all boards have an interest in increasing the total amount of provincial 
funding rather than in redistributing existing funding. 
 
Taxpayers' Perspective 
 
Ultimately, all of the costs of education come from taxpayers. In Manitoba the 
property tax provides about 44% of the costs of public education. This tax is 
offset by a complex set of tax credits delivered through the income tax and 
property tax system to various target groups. About 50% of the tax credits are 
neither income dependent nor linked to the level of the property taxes in 
question. Over the years, tax incidence levels have shifted so that particular 
groups, such as residents of rural towns and villages, pay almost no property 
taxes for education, and others, such as land-intensive farmers, pay very high 
education taxes. Taxpayers in adjoining school divisions may pay radically 
different rates yet enjoy roughly the same educational services. 
 
Departmental Perspective 
 
The Department of Education and Training must disburse funding for public 
education in a manner that is fair and that assists divisions to provide programs 
consistently across the Province. It is doubtful that the GSEP adequately 
responds to demands. 
 
Field Perspective 
 
Staff members who deliver education services to Manitoba's children generally 
agree there are significant disparities in education programs and opportunities 
across the province. Through local and provincial organizations, they have 
made repeated calls for funding to reduce these disparities. 
 
The Feasibility of Change 
 
Central Government Perspective 
 
Manitoba's central government agencies have called on line departments to 
become increasingly accountable for achieving specific program goals with 
assigned funding. At present, there are no clear program goals in the Depart-
ment of Education against which assigned funding levels can be tested. Few 
elements link system goals with funding, program levels, and outcomes at any 
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level of the system. 
 This is not a recent problem, but rather stems from what might be termed `
`benign neglect'' dating from the re-organization of school division boundaries 
in the mid-1960s. No government since that time has seen public education as 
a major priority in policy. Although funding has been generous, it has been 
mechanistically distributed, and thus the direction of current programs is 
divorced from funding. 
 The GSEP is fiscally driven, with few program- or service-level goals 
informing funding. It is thus incapable of serving as a funding mechanism in a 
system that seeks to develop program accountability. In other words, it cannot 
serve the central government's current goal of accountability. 
 
Departmental and Field Perspective 
 
Department and field perspectives on this issue are similar to that of the central 
government. Over the past few years, most divisions have developed increased 
financial management capacity, and accept the provincial financial reporting 
system (FRAME). Although divisions sometimes allocate expenditures to 
inappropriate FRAME categories, this may well result from there being no 
incentives to increase accuracy since FRAME data are not central in 
determining funding levels in the GSEP. 
 
In sum, structural reform of Manitoba's educational finance system is 
warranted according to field, departmental and central government perspec-
tives. Reform is feasible; the development in 1988 of a fully functional model 
of an altered funding system proved this. There is significant support from the 
three major educational organizations for a new funding system. The elements 
of a significant reform are in place. Yet, as of the end of 1990, no new 
educational finance package has been announced. Why has reform not 
proceeded? 
 
Political Realities and Incapacities 
 
At this point we return to the initial section of our article, and indicate how the 
constraints and incapacities earlier described have worked in this particular 
case. Each of the limitations has had an important effect on finance reform. 
 Educational finance reform in Manitoba has suffered because such reform 
is complex, difficult to grasp. With the advent of a new government in 1988, 
Cabinet ministers needed time to acquire at least a rudimentary understanding 
of the finance system and possible alternatives. In Manitoba, educational 
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finance reform was not a significant part of any party's commitment during the 
1990 election, nor has it been high on the Conservative government's political 
agenda, with the exception of tax relief for farmers, partly implemented 
already. 
 The problem was exacerbated by the limited ability of both the Department 
of Education and the Department of Finance to project the financial 
implications of various changes over the medium-to-long term. Bureaucratic 
units have assumed continuance of similar policies, and have difficulty 
answering questions about what might happen under quite different rules and 
conditions. The capacity to provide sound advice is therefore limited. When 
the Education finance unit developed a reasoned approach to long-term 
forecasting, it found that interest in such projections among politicians and 
political staff was not very high, especially from 1988 to 1990, while the 
government was in minority. 
 A central problem of the reform is, in fact, an effect of the 1988 change in 
government. The finance reform was conceived and initiated under the 
previous government. The substantive content of the proposed change, its 
discussion, and its implementation occurred under particular political 
conditions, and envisaged a particular group of policy mkers. The review was 
well advanced when the 1988 election and change of government came. Many 
of the fundamental parameters then shifted, but strategy did not officially 
change—no doubt partly because the new Minister did not at first see clearly 
the various implications of the review and therefore could not give directions 
about change. The tremendous pressure from so many sides and on so many 
issues that immediately hits a new minister, and then continues unrelentingly, 
also makes it difficult to devote sustained attention to any particular issue, 
even one as important as educational finance. 
 The new government has also sought to manage other complex issues that 
have national implications, such as Meech Lake, where Manitoba turned out to 
have a very important role. The political agenda has been extremely crowded 
and the stakes on national issues very high. Cabinet has been unable to devote 
the time required for full understanding and discussion of the implications of 
educational finance reform. 
 Further, the government was until recently in minority and still has only a 
bare majority. Until the last election the government's primary consideration 
was survival and obtaining a majority. Each policy action was evaluated under 
that constraint. Thorough-going educational finance reform, especially when 
linked to impending property assessment reform, is likely to be controversial 
and hard to sell to the public, and hence is to be avoided in minority 
government. It is too soon to know whether the slim majority the 
REFORM OF EDUCATIONAL FINANCE 45 
 
 
Conservatives obtained in the fall of 1990 will change the government's 
approach to educational finance reform. 
 The Conservative government has also been most anxious about the 
provincial budget deficit, and therefore reluctant to consider alternatives 
requiring injections of new money into the education system. Without new 
money, government has difficulty creating support for policy change. 
 The Conservative government is composed largely of members from rural 
constituencies. This means great weight will be given in decision making to 
the interests of rural school divisions, and to such issues such as pupil 
transportation. Many of the preoccupations of the former government, such as 
the needs of the inner city, are now much less salient. 
 A further barrier to change came with another of Dror's low-probability 
events. Through an unusual set of circumstances, three senior members of one 
particular school division were catapulted into senior governmental advisory 
or staff positions. The Deputy Minister of Education, a senior advisor to the 
Premier (since elected an MLA), and the Chair of the Minister's Advisory 
Committee on Education Finance—all from the same school division—have 
considerable influence on government policy. Since the school division in 
question has strong and not necessarily typical views on major issues, reform 
has been significantly affected. 
 Finally, senior staff persons who conducted the finance review were 
appointed by the previous government, and were viewed with considerable 
suspicion by the new government. Manitoba has a politicized (by Canadian 
standards) senior administration; those who survive from one administration to 
the next may still be removed in due course. This happened to the Assistant 
Deputy Minister of Education, who had been responsible for the finance 
reform effort. However, because there were no other senior staff with a 
background that would enable them to take over reform, reform was largely 
halted for some months so the bureaucracy could develop new expertise to 
compensate for his removal. 
 Thus, despite the feasibility of and imperative for change, educational 
finance reform did not proceed. All of the difficulties outlined at the beginning 
of this article played a part in these events. Limits of time, attention, and 
understanding both slowed the reform effort and reduced its priority in 
government. Political pressure from various interest groups, particularly from 
those with close links to the new government, raised questions about the 
credibility of work done in 1987 and early 1988. Reluctance to provide 
additional funds narrowed the reform options available. The needs of a 
minority government brought issues other than educational finance to the fore. 
 In all of this, issues of implementation have received particularly short 
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shrift. The 1987–1988 review assumed that implementation could be fostered 
through participation in policy making. However, well over a year has now 
passed since the end of the formal discussions on finance reform. Changing 
circumstances and budget pressures may well undermine a fragile consensus. 
Thus, even were changes to be announced soon, there might be more 
opposition to them, both in principle and in their implementation, than would 
have been the case with an earlier announcement. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
We do not think the particular circumstances described here unusual. Indeed, 
we would suggest that, although the specifics may vary, any complex policy 
reform will have to contend with the kinds of events, both anticipated and not, 
that occurred in Manitoba. Change in any policy arena takes place on ground 
that is itself changing. We are drawn to the analogy of so-called chaotic 
systems such as weather, in which small perturbations in any system may have 
dramatic long-term effects. 
 Persons interested in reform, then, must be prepared to work in a disruptive 
and disrupted world. It is not reasonable to expect a major policy reform to be 
developed, approved, and implemented in a smooth and linear way. It might 
be better, perhaps, to think of the reform process as analogous to whitewater 
rafting on an unfamiliar river. There will be periods of intense and even frantic 
activity, as well as periods where activity stalls. Reform is not smooth and 
continuous. 
 Under these conditions, promoters of reform must be prepared to be 
persistent, patient, and adaptable. Persistence is required to keep the objective 
in mind and to follow through on reform despite major unforeseen obstacles 
and substantial delays; to continue to look for opportunities to move forward 
whenever these occur; and to work towards effective implementation of policy 
changes. Patience is required in inauspicious times, or when other agendas 
come to the fore and a reform agenda has to be delayed or temporarily put 
aside. It is important not to be discouraged too easily at such times. And 
adaptability is required to make changes in any reform proposal, changes 
which without destroying the reform's integrity may yet secure a crucial vote 
or opinion, or overcome a particularly difficult obstacle. 
 The obstacles cited at the beginning of the article are, as our case study 
illustrates, substantial, and they have important implications. The pursuit of 
reform may seem so difficult as to be overwhelming. Yet change takes place. 
We argue for recognizing the difficulties without abandoning the enterprise, 
for a point of view that does not underestimate the task but equally does not 
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shirk from it. We can be assured at the outset only that the journey will be 
important, interesting, and full of surprises. 
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